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At present Bangladesh is hosting more than 1.1 million of Rohingyas who have been 
migrated from Myanmar and maximum of them are living in 34 makeshift camps of Cox‟s 
Bazar and some thousands start to live at Bhashan Char of Bangladesh. The Government of 
Bangladesh (GoB) does not recognize Rohingyas as refugees and so they are not entitled to 
claim even the rights of refugees in Bangladesh. Getting support from the international 
community, the GoB still tries to repatriate Rohingyas to Myanmar, as the repatriation will 
relieve the huge burden of Bangladesh. But Rohingyas are not interested to go back to their 
home country, Myanmar without establishing their citizenship and some other rights. As a 
result, till today not a single Rohingya has been repatriated to Myanmar and so at present the 
future of the Rohingya is in uncertainty. Bangladesh always think the fruitful solution of the 
Rohingya Crisis lies on their repatriation but more than three years after Rohingyas‟ new 
entry in 2017 no repatriation happens and so the question arises what may be the future of 
Rohingyas? Is the future of Rohingyas rely on their repatriation or staying in Bangladesh for 
a longer period of time with or without restoring their rights, would be tried to discuss in this 
article. If the Rohingyas will have to stay in Bangladesh for a longer time, then what the GoB 
should do, will also be discussed in this paper. For this the field visit and interviews with 
Rohingya refugees at Rohingya Refugee Camp in 2018 and also in 2020 by the first author, 
M. M. Rahman, and his more than 3 years working experience on Rohingya crisis at BTV 
(Bangladesh Television) and the literature reviews by all the authors will be utilized. 
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The Rohingya is the most ill-treated community of the world having lived in a realm of 
statelessness for generation to generation in Rakhine (former Arakan) State of the Republic 
of the Union of Myanmar (Milton et al., 2017). Rohingyas are the Muslims ethnic minority 
community living without citizenship rights at Myanmar and also in Bangladesh (Wekke et 
al. 2017). Rakhine is one of the poorest seven States of Myanmar with total area of 36,778 
km2 (MSR, 2019) where most of the Rohingyas live (Chan, 2005; Mohajan, 2018). Myanmar 
is an independent country of Southeast Asia situated just adjacent Eastern side of Bangladesh 
(UNFPA, 2015; Karim & Islam, 2018). 
Since the August 2017 with the mass expulsion of more than 740,000 Rohingyas from 
Myanmar to Bangladesh, no sustainable solution for the Rohingyas is in sight till today. 
Immediately after the Rohingya exodus in 2017 high profile delegations from Bangladesh 
and Myanmar held several meetings with each other in both countries regarding Rohingya 
repatriation (Aziz, 2019). To send the Rohingyas back to Myanmar a repatriation agreement 
was signed on 23 November 2017 at Naypyidaw, Myanmar between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar (Holmes, 2017; Yhome, 2018). And as per the deal the Rohingya repatriation 
should begin within two months of signing the deal (Rahman, 2017).  
 
As per the repatriation agreement, the Government of Myanmar (GoM) has agreed to accept 
1,500 Rohingyas each week. But till today no Rohingya has been repatriated to Myanmar 
(Kamruzzaman, 2020). If the agreement will be implemented, then it would also take more 
than 10 years to return more than 1.1 million Rohingyas from Bangladesh to their homeland 
because in the agreement it is mentioned that only 1,500 Rohingyas can be repatriated in a 
week. After signing of agreement, a series of painstaking discussions between the proactive 
Bangladesh and the unwilling Myanmar had been held and the two countries agreed to begin 
the attempt of repatriation on 15 November 2018. But the effort failed due to the 
unwillingness of Rohingyas to return back to Myanmar (RFA, 2018). Rohingyas demand that 
they would not return to an unsafe place and they have the fear that they may be persecuted 
again after return. At that time the International community also urged Bangladesh to halt the 
repatriation process as the conditions in Myanmar are not conducive (HRW, 2018a).  
 
Since the failed attempt in November 2018, the GoB put every effort to start repatriation 
again and finally saw a ray of hope for eventual repatriation of Rohingyas to Myanmar after 
China started to influence on GoM to permit the Rohingya Muslims to go to their home. As 
per the Rohingya list cleared by GoM, Bangladesh was all set to start repatriation on 22 
August 2019, but that attempt of Rohingya repatriation also failed as no Rohingya show 
willingness to return to Myanmar. This time also the International Organizations urged 
Myanmar and Bangladesh to halt the repatriation process until Rohingya returns would be 
safe, voluntary, and dignified (HRW, 2019). 
 
International Crisis Group mentioned in its December 2017 report that the main obstacle to 
repatriation is that most Rohingyas are very unlikely to return. Still in 2021 after more than 
three years of 2017 Rohingya exodus the conditions in Rakhine state is not safe for the return 
of Rohingyas (Strangio, 2021) and the Rohingyas living in IDP camps or outside the Camps 
in Rakhine still are facing the discrimination (House of Commons, 2020; OCHA, 2021). 
Again, there is a lack of clarity from GoM on whether they would be allowed to return 
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Rohingyas to their villages of origin and reclaim their farmland at Rakhine state. Because the 
entire Muslim Rohingya villages in Rakhine state have been demolished and replaced by 
police barracks, government buildings and refugee relocation camps (Head, 2019). 
 
The agreement piece between Bangladesh and Myanmar also provides for the issuance of 
National Verification Cards (NVCs) at the point of return; a document most Rohingyas reject 
out of fear that it will codify second-class citizenship status (Horsey, 2017). But the GoM and 
its security forces have expressed concern about the presence of any “terrorists” of Arakan 
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) or their supporters among the Rohingya returnees which 
suggests returnees will be subjected to extreme scrutiny or vetting during the repatriation 
process (McKay, 2019). Another major obstacle or repatriation is that Rakhine Buddhist 
leaders and communities are strongly opposed to the return of any Rohingya (Mohajan, 
2018). 
 
Getting no assurance of return with dignity to their motherland, more than a million 
Rohingyas staying in camps of Cox‟s Bazar, Bangladesh are now facing an uncertain future. 
As the Myanmar authorities still have not addressed the fundamental rights of Rohingyas 
being denied citizenship, freedom of movement, security, and other basic rights and so there 
is slim prospects of return of Rohingyas. Again, many of Rohingyas living in the Cox‟s Bazar 
camps are not still interested to go back to Myanmar because of fear of abusing again if they 
return. So, though the life-saving essentials, such as food, water, sanitation, shelter and basic 
health services are now more or less in place in the camps of Cox‟s Bazar but attention must 
now need to turn to Rohingyas‟ future prospects (Rahman & Mohajan, 2019).  
 
In this study the future of Rohingyas living in Bangladesh will be discussed. As Bangladesh 
is not a party of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol 
and so the country does not have any obligation to recognize Rohingyas as refugees (UNHCR 
2007a; Zetter & Ruaudel 2016) and so the country recognize them as FDMN (forcibly 
displaced Myanmar Nationals). The present status of Rohingya people in Bangladesh will 
also be discussed in this article. We will also try to bring light on the future of Rohingyas 
living in Bangladesh considering whether they could return to Myanmar soon or the GoB 
should ease the restrictions on longer-term assistance like freedom of movement, education 




Many researchers argue that the plight of Rohingyas has the root cause of their statelessness 
identity. Despite their presence in Myanmar dating back to the 8th century, the GoM 
continues to deny the citizenship of the Rohingyas and their most basic human rights since 
1962 or more specifically from 1982 (Rosenthal, 2019). The 1982 Citizenship Law of 
Myanmar has conferred 135 ethnic groups of which the Rohingyas were not included and as 
a result Myanmar has created the world‟s largest stateless population within its territory 
(Zawacki, 2009). Chris Lewa has argued that deprivation of citizenship has served as a key 
strategy to justify arbitrary treatment and discriminatory policies against the Rohingyas 
(Lewa, 2009). 
 
Citizenship and identity are closely intertwined as providing legal basis for the claiming and 
recognition of basic rights of a person. The 2014 population census in Myanmar refused to 
allow for the categorization and recognition of Rohingya population in Rakhine State (Bhatia 
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et al. 2018).  Nancy Hudson-Rodd has argued that this exclusionary practice constitutes the 
denial of the Rohingya community as distinct people or even people worthy of State 
recognition as humans (Hudsoon-Rodd, 2014).  
 
Citizenship is the legal status of belonging and it is associated with array of basic rights 
(Waas & Jaghai, 2018). The New York Times Journalist Nicholas Kristof (2014) mentioned 
that being lack of citizenship the Rohingya has been the target of host of human rights abuses 
by the GoM. They have no rights inside the Myanmar and their movement is also restricted 
(Kristof, 2014). Abdullah Yusuf (2018) argues that the demand of Rohingya is not for an 
independent state of Rakhine, but rather for identity and recognition within the state or within 
the country. He expresses that Rohingya crisis is therefore not only a humanitarian 
emergency, but also concerns issues of security, identity and development of a community 
(Yusuf, 2018).  
 
American economist Forrest Cookson warned that the Rohingyas will not be able to return 
back to their homeland soon and mentioned “it is unlikely that they will ever return” 
(Cookson, 2017). Ibrahim (2018) mentioned that Rohingyas are from being a hated, 
marginalized alien people in Myanmar also to being a marginalized alien in Bangladesh. He 
feared that Myanmar will not take back Rohingyas from Bangladesh and proposed 
Bangladesh to integrate Rohingyas in their own society though it is not possible for densely 
populated country, Bangladesh (Ibrahim, 2018). 
 
Journalist Feliz Solomon described that the GoB is determined that the Rohingya refugees 
will be temporary guests and has enacted hard-line policies to prevent their integration 
(Solomon, 2019). According to the researcher Benedetta Berti, the issue of treating refugees 
as “temporary guests” by Bangladesh is that it results in no long-term development and 
integration (Berti, 2015). Md. Mahbubur Rahman and Haradhan Kumar Mohajan argue that 
as Rohingyas are stateless community of the world and the new generations living in various 
camps do not have the facilities of getting proper education so there may be possibility of the 
new generation of Rohingyas becoming the lost generations (Rahman & Mohajan, 2019).  
 
Methodology of the Study 
 
Research is a careful, systematic, and patient study that investigates in some field of 
knowledge. It tries to discover intellectual and practical answers of various complicate 
problems by scientific methods of real world (Grinnell, 1993). Method is a specific procedure 
to accomplish a task efficiently (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). Methodology refers to the 
principles and ideas on which researchers support their procedures and strategies. Research 
methodology is the science and philosophy behind all researches (Legesse, 2014; Punch, 
2013). According to C. R. Kothari research methodology is the systematic procedure adopted 
by researchers to solve a research problem that maps out the processes, approaches, 
techniques, research procedures, and instruments. It may be understood as a science of 
studying how research is done scientifically (Kothari, 2004). The research methodology 
ultimately determines validity in the research and the value of the research. Reliability and 
validity are inevitable issues in any research. We have tried to maintain validity and 
reliability throughout the paper. 
 
For this article we have reviewed various documents pertaining to the Rohingya crisis. In this 
study we have tried to use secondary data and also the working experience of the authors that 
were obtained through field visit at Rohingya camp in 2018 and 2020 and dealing with 
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Rohingya crisis. For the collection of secondary data, we have used both published and grey 
data sources. We have stressed on national and international journals, e-journals, a lot of 
books and handbooks of famous authors, historical documents, theses, magazines, 
newspapers, websites, etc. to collect the data. In this article we have also given some priority 
on unpublished data, which are collected from unpublished biographies and autobiographies 
of scholars, documents of various public and private organizations, and diaries and letters of 
reliable sources.  
 
Result and Discussion 
 
Who are Rohingyas? 
 
The Rohingya is an ethnic minority group living in Myanmar for centuries. They have been 
living in Western Rakhine State (Arakan) of Myanmar from 8th century (Nurain, 2010; 
Forster, 2011). Myanmar is a majority-Buddhist state, but the Rohingya is primarily Muslim 
living in Rakhine date back to centuries. On the other hand, the Buddhist nationalists 
demand that Rohingyas are not a part of Myanmar‟s 2,200-year-old history, and claim 
Rohingyas are illegal Bengali immigrants (Ullah, 2017). Viewed by the UN as one of the 
world‟s most persecuted community, thousands of Rohingya flee their countries every year 
attempt to reach mainly in Bangladesh and also in other Muslim countries like Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (Warzone Initiatives, 2015; Kazmi, 2017; Gaffar, 
2018). 
 
The human rights report of the US State Department (USSD) for 2015 stated, “The name 
Rohingya is used to describe an ethnic group defined by religious, linguistic and other ethnic 
features.” The term “Rohingya” cannot be explained precisely and it is used as taboo in 
Myanmar. The term „Rohingya‟ became part of public discourse in 1950s and after the 
reports on human rights violations against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State in 1978, 
1990s, 2012 and predominantly in 2017 (Leider, 2018). Dr. Francis Buchanan working as a 
surgeon at the British East India Company was the only person who mentioned the name 
“Rohingyas” in his linguistic survey book in 1799 (Leider, 2014). 
 
Though the word “Rohingya” is too taboo to be accepted inside Myanmar but the historical 
record has established the fact that the Muslim minority Rohingya existed in Rakhine for 
centuries and at that time the Muslims were identified themselves simply as Muslims or 
Arakan Muslims (Yegar, 1972; Nemoto, 1991; Gibson et al. 2016; Alam, 2018). From the 
12th centuries after the disappearance of Hinduism and the assimilation of Mongolians and 
Tibeto-Burmans in Rakhine there remained only two distinctive races; the Rohingya 
(Muslims) and the Mugh (Buddhists), who lived together in Rakhine centuries after centuries 
(Ullah, 2016). Both Muslim and Buddhist population always maintained an independent 
status quo before the establishment of Mrauk-U dynasty by Solaiman Shah (Narameikhla) in 
1430 (Yunus, 1994).  
 
The Rohingya was counted as a part of the Mrauk- U (Mrohaung) kingdom in Arakan 
(Rakhine). Mrauk U was an independent kingdom consisting of Rakhine State (Arakan), 
Myanmar and Chittagong Division of Bangladesh which existed for over 354 years (1430–
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Rohingyas are Refugees or Not  
 
A refugee, generally speaking, is a displaced person who has been forced to cross national 
boundaries and who cannot return home safely. According to the Merriam Webster 
Dictionary, the term “refugee” comes from the Latin word “refugium” that means “the act 
of taking refuge,” and the word was first used in France  as “réfugié” to refer to the 
Huguenots (French Protestants), who fled to other countries after a law protecting their 
religious liberty was revoked in 1685. Sometimes it is used to refer a person who is 
displaced due to a natural disaster like environmental change. In short, it can be said that “A 
refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, 
war, violence or environmental change.” By the end of 2018, there were 25.9 million 
refugees registered across the world (UNHCR, 2019b). 
 
After the World War II, International Refugee Organization (IRO) that was created in 1947, 
started dealing with the problems of refugees in Europe. Later, the General Assembly 
adopted the Statute of the UNHCR on 14 December 1950 replacing the IRO. Finally, the 
well-accepted definition of „refugee‟ derived from the 1951 International Convention on the 
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees namely the 1967 Protocol 
(Yesmin, 2016). The Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees no longer define „refugee‟ 
simply as a displaced person, rather identify in specific terms (Kennedy, 1986). 
 
1951 Geneva Convention is the main international instrument of refugee law. As the 1951 
Convention was created in the post-World War II European setting, it has been referred to as 
Eurocentric. Due to the temporal and spatial limits of the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees was added to make it more applicable to refugee 
movements around the world (Jastram & Achiron, 2001). 
 
1951 Refugee Convention is a key legal document and defines a refugee (PU & UNHCR, 
2017; UNHCR, 2018b) as: “A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality, and is unable to or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” 
 
In 1969, Organization of African Unity (OAU) included as reasons for refugee flight 
“external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order.” In 1984 Cartagena Declaration incorporated OAU definition PLUS “massive 
violation of human rights.” Considering all these international concepts on refugee it can be 
said that every Rohingya falls under the universal concept of „refugee‟ (UNHCR, 2018b). 
 
Bangladesh Recognize Rohingyas as ‘FDMN’ not as Refugee 
 
International law stipulates that the normative responsibility to protect refugees falls on the 
host state. But it is not possible if the host country is not party to the 1951 Convention. 
Bangladesh is not a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 
1967 Protocol. Bangladesh also does not have any law regulating the administration of 
refugee affairs in Bangladesh or guaranteeing the realization of the rights of refugees. Again 
Bangladesh does not have any intension to recognize the Rohingyas as refugees. Though 
Bangladesh is not a party to the international convention relating refugees but the country has 
always shown its generosity to provide shelter and food to the Rohingya (Purkey, 2013). 
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Bangladesh has received a large number of Rohingyas in various phases. In dealing with the 
Rohingya people Bangladesh has moved from a liberal welcoming policy to a realist policy 
(Yesmin, 2016). When the first batch of Rohingya people fled in 1978 then Bangladesh saw 
it as a humanitarian crisis and made substantial efforts to help them. But from the beginning 
Bangladesh had clearly maintained that the asylum for the Rohingyas was temporary and 
encouraged their immediate return. Within 16 months of arrival in 1978 most of the 
Rohingyas were repatriated to Myanmar. In 1991–1992, there was another 250,000 
Rohingyas came to Bangladesh, owing to military crackdown in Myanmar following the 
failed democratic election in 1990. Although the majority of refugees were repatriated to 
Northern Myanmar during the following decade, many of these sought their way back to 
Bangladesh (UNHCR & WFP , 2012).  
 
Up to 1992, the Rohingya coming as asylum seekers from Myanmar were provided refugee 
status under executive orders of the GoB. They were granted prima facie refugee status 
(Mohammad, 2012). Since 1992, the GoB stopped registering Rohingyas as refugees 
(UNHCR & WFP , 2012). Rohingyas who have arrived after 1992 are labeled as 
“undocumented Myanmar nationals‟‟ or “unregistered refugees‟‟ and they live in makeshift 
camps or with host communities and are considered to be illegally residing in Bangladesh 
(UNHCR, 2007a; ECHO, 2018). After 1992, Rohingyas entering into Bangladesh are also 
recognized as “illegal migrants” to Bangladesh (Bashar, 2012). So, it is horrific for 
Rohingyas that after 1992 the official status of “refugee” is something the Rohingya have 
struggled with for years now (Ullah, 2017).  
 
Prior to August 2017 Rohingya influx around 34,000 Rohingyas were officially registered as 
refugees in Bangladesh and resided in UNHCR managed two camps “Kutupalong” in Ukhia 
(sub-district) and “Nayapara” in Teknaf (sub-district) of Cox‟s Bazar. But an estimated 
additional 300,000–500,000 Rohingyas were living in informal settlements (unregistered 
makeshift camps, e.g., Leda Camps) and with host communities (Green et al., 2018). 
 
In 2017, the GoB has described Rohingyas not as refugees but as “forcibly displaced 
Myanmar nationals (FDMN)”, denying the Rohingya legal refugee status and the rights 
associated with this. On 28 September 2017, foreign secretary M. Shahidul Haque said that 
GoB had decided to call Rohingyasas “forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals (FDMN)” 
instead of “refugees” (The Daily Star, 2017). 
 
Bangladesh’s Law and Policy towards Rohingyas 
 
The Rohingya crisis is a human rights and humanitarian disaster that has, in recent years 
(from August 2017 to today), rapidly grown in numbers, yet declined in access and resources. 
As of August 2017, over 700,000 Rohingyas fled from Rakhine state of Myanmar to 
Bangladesh and settled in the Kutupalong refugee settlement of Cox‟s Bazar, now the 
world‟s largest refugee camp. There are now 34 Rohingya camps at Cox‟s Bazar (JRP, 
2019).  
 
Bangladesh shows generosity by opening its border to Rohingya people at the time when 
many other countries of the world are building walls, pushing asylum seekers back at borders, 
and deporting people without adequately considering their protection claims. Although not a 
party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Bangladesh has upheld its customary international 
law obligation to keep the border open to fleeing Rohingyas and acted to accommodate and 
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meet the humanitarian needs of hundreds of thousands of desperate people fleeing crimes 
against humanity (HRW, 2018b). 
 
Bangladesh is not a party to the UN 1951 Refugee Convention or its protocol of 1967. 
Bangladesh does not have any domestic statute or national policy that addresses the refugees 
or asylum seekers. But Bangladesh is signatory to a number of international instruments 
whose provision indirectly promote the rights of refugees. However, the Constitution of 
Bangladesh has guaranteed certain human rights even to foreigners or non-citizens. Now the 
question arise how the Rohingya people get „Refugee Status‟ in 1978 and up to 1992. The 
answer is that during that time Bangladesh gave the refugee status to the Rohingyas by the 
“Executive Order” of the GoB. At that time Rohingyas were given “prima facie refugee 
status” (Mohammad, 2012). 
 
If we consider how the Rohingya crisis is dealt by the GoB, then it is observed that the 
Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MDMR) is the Government administration 
responsible for refugee related issues and coordinating activities in relation to camp based 
refugees. The MDMR has designated responsibility for a range of camp administrative 
matters (management, delivery of assistance, health care, water and sanitation and camp 
maintenance) to the office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner (RRRC).  
 
The RRRC is the highest official in charge and each camp also has a Camp-in-Charge (CIC) 
deputed by the Government who is responsible for providing facilities to the refugees, for 
maintaining the law and order and for the activities of the camp as a whole. Army, Police, 
Ansar are also deputed to the camps for security enforcement under the direct supervision of 
the CIC. The role of the office of the UNHCR is one of overall coordination and protection of 
the refugees‟ rights. Bangladesh military people were engaged for the first time in September 
2017 to provide the ground support at the Rohingya camps (HRP , 2018).  
 
The MDMR represented by the RRRC at the local level, is charged with operational 
coordination at the camps but the Ministry of Home Affairs, with technical support from the 
Bangladesh Immigration and Passports Department is also responsible to register the 
Rohingya. The Rohingya is confined within several camps in the Cox‟s Bazar district of 
Bangladesh, which are managed jointly by the GoB and a coordinating body of international 
organizations called the Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG).  
 
The ISCG was formed in 2017 in Cox‟s Bazar to facilitate coordination among humanitarian 
actors working for a coherent response to Rohingyas and affected host communities. It brings 
together a variety of UN and other agencies (national/international NGOs and others) and the 
Cox‟s Bazar based Government authorities establishing close synergies between different 
entities.  
 
The main objective of the ISCG is to facilitate an effective, efficient and coordinated 
humanitarian response to the urgent needs of Rohingya refugees in Cox‟s Bazar. The ISCG is 
a repository of information and real time updates providing guidance and support to ISCG 
partners and sectors. The ISCG, hosted by IOM and UNHCR is coordinating the overall 
Rohingya crisis. It facilitates timely, coordinated, need-based and evidence-driven 
humanitarian assistance for efficient use of resources and to avoid duplication. Situation 
reports and 4W (Who, doing what, where and when), maps and data is regularly produced 
and updated. The ISCG is also responsible to prepare the Joint Response Plan (JRP) for 
Rohingyas (UNHCR, 2018a). 
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Registration of Rohingyas in Bangladesh – A Historic Event 
 
In June 2018, the GoB and the UN refugee agency UNHCR have started to register hundreds 
of thousands of Rohingyas who have fled to Cox‟s Bazar to escape violence and persecution 
in Myanmar. The registration process was for all the Rohingyas who came in August 2017 
and afterwards and also for others who have fled previous waves of persecution in Myanmar. 
This registration gives identification document to many Rohingyas for the first time in their 
life (VOA, 2019). But from September 2017 to June 2018, the GoB has started recording 
biometric data of Rohingyas (The Daily Star, 2017). The Bangladesh Government Ministry 
of Home Affairs led the biometric registration process with technical support from the 
Bangladesh Immigration and Passports Department. As in 27 January 2017, the GoB has 
registered 1.04 million Rohingyas (JRP, 2019). 
 
In June 2018, the GoB and UNHCR started the Rohingya registration process jointly. The 
huge database to identify and register hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas is an effort that 
helps the authorities and humanitarian partners to better understand the needs of the 
Rohingyas and will help to safeguard their right to voluntarily return home to Myanmar. In 
the registration process Rohingyas are registered using bio-data and biometric data, including 
fingerprints and iris scans to provide them with a unique identity. At the end of the 
registration process, Rohingyas receive a plastic ID card that includes a photo, and basic 
information such as date of birth and gender. The biometric, fraud-proof cards are being 
issued jointly by the GoB and UNHCR to all verified Rohingyas over the age of 12 but 
families also receive an attestation showing the details of all family members. All information 
on the ID card is in English and Bengali and indicates Myanmar as the country of origin 
having the logo of both the UNHCR and the GoB (UN News, 2019). 
 
In August 2019, in the registration process of Rohingya people, The UNHCR used the Global 
Distribution Tool (GDT) for the first time in Rohingya refugee camps. The GDT is used to 
speed up the registration process and it can check any fraud or overlap in the registration 
process. The issuing of ID cards for the Rohingya people has enabled the GoB to know the 
exact number of the Rohingya staying in Bangladesh that will very much helpful to address 
the crisis (UNHCR, 2019a).  
 
During his visit to Cox‟s Bazar, Rohingya camp in February 2020 the first author talked to 
15-20 Rohingya refugees and asked them about their registering process. All the Rohingya 
people confirmed the author that they were registered and when asked about their ID cards 
they also show their cards. 
 
Future of Rohingyas in Bangladesh 
 
Many Rohingyas do not want to return to Myanmar. When the author talked to the Rohingya 
people they categorically mentioned that they will not go to Myanmar until their citizenship 
and Rohingya status are confirmed. The GoM does not want the Rohingyas back. No one 
knows how long Rohingyas will have to stay in Bangladesh and under which conditions. 
Assuming that Bangladesh will not force Rohingyas to return, there are still many challenges 
to long term living in the camps. Since 1978 Bangladesh is the first destination of Rohingya 
asylum seekers due to the proximity and common religion and culture. Though Bangladesh is 
open to the Rohingya minority but Bangladesh does not want the Rohingya to settle or 
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integrate to its territory, but rather want them to eventually be repatriated to Myanmar 
(UNHCR, 2011a). 
 
The International agencies promote three durable solutions to the refugee problem: 
i) voluntary repatriation,  
ii) local integration, and 
iii) resettlement. 
 
 As densely populated and with limited resource, Bangladesh is not a position to integrate 
more than 1.1 million Rohingyas to its territory. Bangladesh also does not appreciate the 
resettlement of Rohingyas in third countries because it may promote other Rohingyas in 
Myanmar to come to Bangladesh. But a small-scale resettlement of Rohingyas was done to 
Canada, New Zealand and the UK in 2006 and onward (HR Year Book, 2008; Azad & 




Voluntary repatriation means the voluntary return of refugees to their country of origin. The 
UN refugee agency-UNHCR encourages voluntary repatriation as the best solution for any 
refugee crisis. According to UNHCR‟s statute (UNHCR, 2011a): “Repatriation should be 
voluntary, which includes two elements: freedom of choice and an informed decision, take 
place under conditions of safety and dignity in connection with voluntary repatriation focuses 
on the repatriation process itself and after return.‖   
 
A voluntary decision implies two elements: freedom of choice (which relates to the situation 
in the country of asylum) and an informed decision (which relates to the situation in the 
country of origin) (Ullah, 2019). Bangladesh always advocates for the repatriation of 
Rohingyas as the displaced Rohingya put enormous pressure on its resources, economy and 
environment. Bangladesh sees the repatriation is the only viable solution of Rohingya crisis 
and also Bangladesh gives emphasis that the repatriation should be voluntary. According to 
the latest bilateral instrument signed between Bangladesh and Myanmar on 23 November 
2017, the repatriation of Rohingyas was supposed to begin within 22 January 2018 and to be 
completed by 22 January 2020. After that two repatriation attempts first one on 15 November 
2018 and second one on 22 August 2019 have been taken. But no Rohingyas have yet to be 
repatriated. Despite apparent frustration, the Bangladeshi authorities still believe on the 
international customary that the Rohingya repatriation should be voluntary and in a safe and 
dignified manner (Bangladesh Ministry , 2019). 
 
After the failure of second repatriation attempts of Rohingyas on 22 August 2019 UNHCR in 
its statement said (UNHCR, 2019a), “UNHCR has agreed with the governments of 
Bangladesh and Myanmar that any repatriation of refugees must be voluntary, safe and 
dignified. Respect for these principles will also have the practical effect of helping to ensure 
that return is sustainable.”  
 
For voluntary repatriation Rohingyas also give some demands like guarantee of their 
citizenship, freedom of movement and recognition of their ethnic identity in Myanmar. As 
the preconditions set by Rohingyas cannot be fulfilled by Bangladesh and the Myanmar‟s 
unwillingness to fulfill the Rohingya demands so the host country Bangladesh does not see 
any possibility of voluntary repatriation of Rohingyas soon. 
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During the visit of first author in February 2020 the author intentionally asked the Rohingya 
people living at the camp that “Are you Bengali as Myanmar Govt. mentioning you?” All of 
them replied “we are not Bengalis we are Rohingyas of Myanmar.” When asked about 
whether they want to go back to Myanmar or stay in Bangladesh. They all replied that they 
will want to go back to their homeland, Myanmar but only when their basic rights to be 
ensured. They all mentioned that their identity is Rohingya and so the Myanmar Govt. should 
recognize them as Rohingya also. 
 
―Our demands are - at first, we want security, then our citizenship, then our freedom of 
movement, free and fair marriage right, and then our religion right i.e. right of practicing 
Muslim rituals, and fifth and last our right to get Govt. Job in Myanmar…. If these five rights 
are fulfilled, we will definitely go to our country, Myanmar. And our lands and other assets 
taken by the Myanmar Govt. should be returned to us‖ (Male, 27 years of age). 
 
Local Integration  
 
„Local integration‟ is a legal, economic and political process by which refugees progressively 
become members of the host society (UNHCR, 2001). Social integration is a positive goal, 
implying equal opportunities and rights for all human beings. The official position of the 
GoB is that it will not entertain any notion of local integration of Rohingyas. Besides, 
Bangladesh is not in a position to integrate more than one million Rohingyas with its dense 
population and limited resources (UNRISD, 1994). 
 
Local integration is a complex and gradual process that takes place on three levels – legal, 
economical and social and cultural (UNHCR, 2001): 
Legal: Generally the registered refugees are granted a progressively wider range of rights, 
similar to those enjoyed by citizens, leading eventually to permanent residence and perhaps 
citizenship. 
Economic: The registered refugees become gradually less dependent on aid from the country 
of asylum or on humanitarian assistance and are increasingly self-reliant so that they can 
support themselves and contribute to the local economy. 
Social and cultural: Interaction between refugees and the local community always allows 
refugees to participate in the social life of their new country of staying without fear of 
discrimination or hostility. 
 
As long as the Rohingyas remain in Bangladesh refugee camps, many Rohingyas are being 
tried to integrate into Bangladesh informally. The integration is done mainly by two ways:   i) 
by collecting illegally Bangladeshi nationality documents, and ii) inter-marriage with 
Bangladeshi nationals. To prevent this in the last several months of 2019 there was a 
nationwide hunt for the officials who were found involved issuing Bangladeshi nationality 
documents to some Rohingyas, and the GoB is also starting to make a barbed wire fence 
surrounding the Rohingya camps in Cox‟s Bazar (Azad, 2019). 
 
The GoB has also taken steps like the restrictions on marriage between Rohingyas and 
Bangladeshis, and restrictions on movement, on higher education, and on livelihood outside 
the Rohingya camps. In 2014, marriage between Rohingya and Bangladesh was banned in a 
bid to prevent Rohingyas living in Bangladesh from seeking a backdoor to Bangladeshi 
citizenship. According to the 2014 GoB circular “Anyone found to have married a Rohingya 
can face seven years in prison.” The 2014 circular was also upheld by the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh in 2018 (BBC, 2018). Employment is also seen as a major process of integration. 
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According to the official decision of the GoB, the Rohingyas are not allowed to work outside 
of the camp. In spite of that many Rohingyas are involved in informal jobs and gradually 
become economically self-reliant. Many Rohingyas are seen in and around Cox‟s Bazar in 
various manual jobs including as rickshaw puller, day laborer, fishermen, and domestic 
workers and in dry fish processing (Azad & Jasmin, 2013). 
The Rohingyas who are working informally as unskilled labor in the Cox‟s Bazar area, out of 
the camp face heightened protection risks as the GoB policies prohibiting Rohingyas from 
owning a business and from leaving the camps. These informal opportunities may offer the 
best chance for Rohingyas to become self-reliant; while also supporting local markets 
through the procurement of goods through the income they earn, but they are also the riskiest 
options and can facilitate the potential short-term negative impacts of refugees working, such 




Some Rohingyas who fled to Bangladesh after 1991-92 Myanmar military operation never 
returned to Myanmar rather quietly or silently integrated into Cox‟s Bazar and nearby 
districts. Many of them found works or established business. Over the past 25 years these 
Rohingyas have managed to integrate and establish themselves and this process is called as 
„Quiet Integration‟ by the Crisis Group. This approach is also evident today though this is not 




Resettlement means the permanent movement of refugees to a third country from the country 
of first asylum (UNHCR, 2002). Resettlement serves three important functions (UNHCR, 
2011b):  
i) it is a tool to provide international protection and meet the specific needs of 
individual refugees,  
ii) it is a durable solution for larger numbers or groups of refugees, and  
iii) it can be a tangible expression of international solidarity and a responsibility 
sharing mechanism by the developed nations.  
 
Resettlement was most widely used as a solution to refugee outflows during the 1980s when 
some 700,000 Vietnamese refugees were resettled, in mainly industrialized countries 
(Robinson, 1998). But till today there has been a little resettlement of Rohingyas in third 
countries from Bangladesh. Resettlement of Rohingyas started from Bangladesh in 2006 and 
peaked with 465 departures in 2009. In November 2010, the GoB suspended the resettlement 
process and by the time UNHCR was able to resettle 920 out of 1,997 persons (UNHCR, 
2011b). A spokeswoman for Immigration, Refuges and Citizenship Canada, Shanon Ker, said 
in 2018 that Canada took maximum numbers of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh until the 
country stopped the process in 2010. She also mentioned that Canada resettled more than 300 
Rohingyas from the camps in Bangladesh between 2006 and 2010. But Bangladesh has not 
issued exit permits for the resettlement of Rohingya refugees to any third countries since 
2010 (The Dhaka Tribune, 2018).       
 
The UNHCR has tried to convince Bangladesh to restart the resettlement process of 
Rohingya refugees but the GoB is still concerned that if the Rohingyas are perceived to have 
a better life in Bangladesh or getting chance of resettlement, this will act as a „pull factor‟ for 
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those Rohingyas still residing in Myanmar, as well as „stay factor‟ for Rohingyas currently 
living in Cox‟s Bazar. As a result, the GoB does not think the resettlement options for 
Rohingyas in third countries (Solomon, 2019). 
 
Bangladesh is not interested to resettle the Rohingyas in any third country but it has started to 
execute its plan to relocate 100,000 Rohingyas to a new island named Bhasan Char of Bay of 
Bengal (Bremner, 2020). From December 2020 the GoB has started to shift Rohingya people 
from Cox‟s Bazar to Bhashan Char (Ahmed & Ahmed, 2020).  
 
Bhasan Char, which means “floating island” in Bengali that emerged less than 20 years ago 
in the Bay of Bengal (Opu, 2020), is located 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) away from mainland 
Bangladesh under Hatiya upazila (subdistrict) of Noakhali (Bhattacharyya, 2020). The total 
area of Bhashan Char is 40-square kilometer (15.44-square mile or about 10,000 acres) and 
the island is made of silt that has accumulated in the last two decades (Kamruzzaman, 2020; 
Subramanian, 2020). Bangladesh Government has spent 350 million USD constructing a 
network of shelters on the island under its Ashrayan 3 project (Bhattacharyya, 2020). 
 
Temporary Camps Turn to Permanent Camps  
 
Besides voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement the fourth solution may the 
transfer of temporary camps to permanent camps (Waters, 2019). This de facto solution has 
been used repeatedly around the world. For example, the Gaza Strip in Palestine, which is 
really just a 70-year-old refugee camp, as are Palestinian settlements in Lebanon, the West 
Bank and elsewhere. In Africa, Kenya is home to refugee camps for Somali and South 
Sudanese, and in Tanzania there are decades-old camps for Congolese, Rwandans and 
Burundians (Waters, 2019). 
 
Recommendations given by International Community for the Future of Rohingyas 
 
International community has given some recommendations to the GoB for the better future of 
Rohingyas, which are; i) deed and need of Rohingyas, ii) improve Rohingyas medium term 
prospect, iii) responsibility sharing between Rohingyas and host community, iv) business 
should be getting involved, v) multiyear Joint Response Plan (JRP) instead of one year JRP, 
vi) international outreach, vii) security threats should be minimized at zero level, and viii) 
help ICC and ICJ to get justice for Rohingyas. 
 
Deed and Need of Rohingya Refugees  
 
Rohingyas are expert in what deeds and what may be their needs should be heard and find out 
solutions of them. Generally the Rohingyas are not taken in their need assessment or 
programming activities taken by the GoB or NGOs but it is a fact that Rohingyas should be 
involved in any decisions regarding them even in the repatriation process. Matthew Smith, 
co-founder and chief executive of Fortify Rights, said in 2018, “The Rohingya deserve a seat 
at the table, whether the issue is humanitarian aid, accountability and justice, return of 
refugees or any other issue affecting their lives” (Kyaw, 2019). 
 
Improve Rohingyas Medium Term Prospect  
 
International Crisis Group in its April 2019 report mentioned that allowing formal education 
of Rohingya children should be the first priority. UN and other international organizations 
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feared that without proper education the next generation of Rohingyas may be the lost 
generation (Crisis Group Report, 2019b; Rahman & Mohajan, 2019). 
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) report of December 2019 revealed, “Persisting with the ban on 
formal education is harmful to Bangladesh’s own interests and devastates a new generation 
of Rohingya children, and the future of the Rohingya community as a whole. The GoB should 
end restrictions on Rohingya refugees’ freedom of movement and access to the internet and 
online communications” (HRW, 2019).  
 
Bangladesh is de facto permitting some of this assistance as the UN and dozens of domestic 
and international NGOs are present in the Rohingya camps and working on a broad range of 
protection and assistance programs around health, education, protection and community 
outreach (Gorlic, 2019). 
 
Responsibility Sharing between Rohingyas and Host Community 
 
Cox‟s Bazar, the South Eastern district of Bangladesh, has sheltered Rohingya refugees over 
the decades and now more than 1.1 million Rohingyas are living in various camps of Cox‟s 
Bazar. At present the situation is like that the Rohingyas have become the majority of the 
population in Cox‟s Bazar leaving the host community in the minority. Assessing the 
Rohingya and host community needs is critical for prioritizing resource allocations and to 
maintain the status quo between Rohingyas and the locals. Moving forward, responsibility 
sharing between Rohingyas and hosts are needed to ensure the well-being of both the 
communities. For responsibility sharing contributions should come from UN Member 
States, multilateral development banks, and regional organizations, as well as from the 
GoB (Huang & Gough, 2019). 
 
Centre for Global Development has proposed three ways for labor mobility activities to 
support the host communities in Cox‟s Bazar and also the Rohingya which are (Khan & 
Dempster, 2019): i) up skill the host community under a Global Skill Partnership model, ii) 
extend labor mobility agreements with Gulf Cooperation Council and East and Southeast 
Asian countries, and iii) promote limited labor migration opportunities for Rohingya 
refugees. 
 
It is now obvious to create an environment to improve the social bonds between the host 
communities and the Rohingya beyond their restricted activities. If Rohingyas are given 
opportunity to improve their skills then after returning to Rakhine they would be able to make 
a contribution to the development of their communities. These Rohingyas then may become 
the bridge between Bangladesh and Myanmar (Mir, 2019). 
 
Business should be Getting Involved 
 
Investment in business can be considered as a solution for the Rohingya crisis. A new 
business can create new job opportunities that will in turn help to alleviate poverty of the 
Cox‟s Bazar  and also in Bhashan Char. Centre for Global Development has proposed four 
viable areas of business investment in Cox‟s Bazar which are (Sun et al., 2019): i) investing 
in clean energy, ii) investing in and/or sourcing sea food, iii) investing in and/or sourcing 
fruit products and non-timber forest products like honey, and iv) sourcing handicrafts, 
specialized clothing, and home goods. 
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It should be kept in mind that the tourist business of Bangladesh is centered on Cox‟s Bazar 
sea beach which is not far from the Rohingya camps. Any vulnerable situation of Rohingya 
camps may disturb the tourist business of Bangladesh and so the Rohingyas should not be 
kept free or out of business or any jobs. 
 
Multiyear JRP Instead of One Year JRP  
 
The Joint Response Plan (JRP) has been prepared by the UN and its aid partners in a yearly 
basis to look after the Rohingya refuges in Bangladesh. The Crisis Group in its December 
2019 report said that Dhaka should drop the one year JRP rather it should work with the UN 
to formulate a multiyear JRP to meet the needs of the Rohingya and the host communities of 
Cox‟s Bazar (Crisis Group Report, 2019b). 
 
Some other Recommendations for the Future of Rohingyas 
 
As Rohingyas are not interested to go back to Myanmar and Bangladesh also fails to manage 
international community to put more pressure on Myanmar so that they take their citizens 
back to home and so the following recommendations may be considered for the future of 
Rohingyas. 
 
International Outreach  
 
Bangladesh has been praised by international community for opening its border and giving 
shelter to more than 1.1 million Rohingyas. But Bangladesh should be careful about the 
continuous engagement of the international community to solve the Rohingya crisis. 
Bangladesh alone cannot solve the Rohingya crisis but the involvement of international 
community is a must to solve the crisis. The engagement of international community is also 
necessary because it would mentally support Rohingyas of thinking that the international 
community is with them to lessen their woe and sufferings. It is true that Bangladesh is 
relying on its neighboring friends like India and China to solve the Rohingya crisis. But it 
should be noted that both India and China are weapon supplier to Myanmar and they are also 
involved economically with Myanmar.  
 
Accepting these facts Bangladesh now may move forward creating an alliance with other 
countries to solve the Rohingya crisis. The list may include interested EU members, Japan, 
Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea and all of the members of the Five Eyes countries (the 
USA, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand). Such an alliance may become vital for 
the safe repatriation of the Rohingya, as well as future human and environmental security of 
South Asia (Mir, 2019). 
 
Security Threats should be Minimized at Zero Level 
 
The GoB needs to be alert always that the Rohingya camps may not be treated by any groups 
as a base for insurgency. Any attempts by extremists group to radicalize Rohingyas need to 
be controlled. Though it is not a problem now but it is difficult to imagine that this will last 
for infinity as more than 1.1 million people sit in the camps without any future. The Arakan 
Salvation Army (ARSA) was responsible by the GoM for the Myanmar Army‟s clearance 
operation in 2017 may try to recruit its member from the Rohingya camps. Possibly the 
biggest immediate threat is the potential for the Rohingya community to become a conduit for 
drugs into Bangladesh. The lack of economic opportunities in Myanmar have already forced 
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some people into illegitimate activities, such as drug distribution, including a particularly 
addictive form of methamphetamine known as “Yaba”  produced inside Myanmar‟s 
ungoverned spaces. Without any legitimate source of income in Bangladesh, there is a high 
risk of the development of networks for smuggling and distribution of Yaba throughout 
Bangladesh with potential to destabilize the community (Brewster, 2019). 
 
Security measures have already been taken by the GoB to control the trafficking, drug trading 
inside the camps and it needs to be continued. It should be kept in mind that security 
measures need to be taken to ensure accountability of the offenders but the measure should 
not disturb the normal life of the Rohingya. The Crisis Group said “If the Bangladeshi 
government continues to look at the Rohingya crisis through a short-term lens and falls into a 
pattern of heavy-handed responses to security challenges, the situation could become more 
fraught and dangerous for all concerned. In the absence of prospects for repatriation and 
longer-term planning, such a crackdown will only increase the refugees’ desperation. It 
could even make them more susceptible to recruitment into criminal or extremist networks, 
which would add to the security challenges Bangladesh faces” (Crisis Group Report, 2019b). 
 
Help ICC and ICJ to Get Justice for Rohingyas  
 
In November 2019, three separate cases were filed against Myanmar for atrocities committed 
against Rohingyas. It was the first international legal attempts to bring justice to the 
persecuted Muslim minority group of Myanmar.  
 
On 11 November 2019, Gambia filed a genocide case against Myanmar in the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming that the GoM has violated the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. On 14 November 2019, International 
Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation for crimes that Myanmar soldiers and police 
committed against the Rohingya in Bangladesh. Also on 14 November 2019, some Latin 
American human rights groups used Argentine Courts to sue Aung San Suu Kyi and other top 
Myanmar officials for the same crimes under the principle of “universal jurisdiction”. ICC 
was created in 1998 in the hope that it could complement the ICJ: it has no competence on 
states, but it can indict and even punish individuals who have perpetrated gross violations of 
human rights. Bangladesh is a member of ICC but Myanmar is not. Though Myanmar is not a 
member but ICC said that it could investigate the crimes against Rohingyas because the 
deportations involve a cross-border crime that gives the court jurisdiction to investigate the 
plight of the Rohingya. ICC judges have approved a full investigation on 14 November 2019 
into Myanmar alleged crimes against the Rohingyas (ICC, 2019). 
 
The ICJ also called World Court is the principal judicial organ of the UN. It was established 
in June 1945 by the Charter of the UN and began to work in April 1946. The ICJ has the 
authority to address controversies between nation states. If ICJ finds that Myanmar has 
violated its international obligations and Rohingyas have been persecuted then it could ask 
the GoM to provide reparations and guarantee repatriations. If ICJ produces a strong ruling, 
the UN Security Council could decide to intervene, either through sanctions against Myanmar 
or even in military action. ICJ in its provisional measures on 23 January 2020 has ordered 
Myanmar to stop genocide and take appropriate measures to protect the Rohingya Muslims 
(ICJ, 2020). 
 
Legal devices have the direct effects of alleviating the suffering of the victims, restoring 
truth, allowing reconciliation and bringing the most egregious criminals to justice. So it can 
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be said that the three new proceedings (ICC, ICJ and case in Argentina) are important for 
Rohingyas (Archibugi, 2019).  
 
Bangladesh should assist Gambia, ICC prosecutors and also the party against Myanmar in 
Argentina case to find out the truth on Rohingya persecutions. International proceedings will 
definitely help Bangladesh to solve the Rohingya crisis. Global think tank, Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) mentioned seven recommendations for Rohingyas‟ future as 
(Wake et al., 2019): 1) continue to press for adequate levels of funding to improve living 
conditions in camps for Rohingya refugees, 2) effective communication and engagement of 
refugees, 3) continue with surveys on medium-term aspirations and support, 4) improve 
community engagement, community relationships and camp governance, 5) adopt strategies 
to contribute to the self-reliance of refugees, 6) focus international dialogue on the priorities 
articulated by refugees, and 7) develop, fund and deliver a medium-term development plan 




The best solution for Rohingya crisis is the voluntary return of Rohingyas from Bangladesh 
with safety and dignity in pursuit of their normal lives in Rakhine State. Voluntary 
repatriation is the only viable solution for most of the refugee crisis of the world. Since the 
World War II, around 70% of world‟s refugee‟s found a durable solution by returning home. 
 
Rohingyas do not have refugee status in Bangladesh and as a consequence they are deprived 
of any refugee protections ensured by international law. More than 1.1 million of Rohingyas, 
staying in the camps, find themselves confined, with significant restrictions on work or 
movement by the GoB denied the chance in Myanmar to fulfill their human capabilities, 
Rohingyas must not be consigned to inanition, sequestered in camps in Bangladesh. 
Rohingyas should be given some hope to live like a human being. 
 
The situation of Rohingyas in Bangladesh is like that they will not be returning to Myanmar 
anytime soon. So for the foreseeable future the camps in Cox‟s Bazar, Bangladesh will be the 
only home for Rohingyas. The GoB should do everything in its power to make the camps 
more livable, while donors should provide sufficient aid to ease the burden on Bangladesh.  
 
The most urgent need is to inject some hope in the minds of Rohingyas and also to the host 
communities of Cox‟s Bazar that they are not forgotten. Both groups must be assured that 
continuous efforts are being made to resolve the Rohingya crisis sooner or later. The ultimate 
aim is still for Rohingyas to return to their home in Myanmar. But the immediate aim should 
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